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The problems considered in NOMINALISTIC PRINCIPLE arise from the economic importance of currency units or, simply, money. Market transac-

tions (or trades) between economic agents are only undertaken when both
participants expect to benefit by doing so. In the absence of a medium of
exchange, trade must be conducted by barter. The likely result of the
barter economy is that each economic agent attempts self-sufficiency in
production. The existence of a medium of exchange means that trade need
not be conducted by barter. More precisely, the existence of money reduces
the cost (or increases the efficiency) of trade and encourages production
specialization. Plainly, money must be convertible into goods to function
as a medium of exchange. The predominant requirement for this result is
confidence in the general acceptability of the currency unit throughout the
economy. This process introduces a time dimension to consumption. Obviously, money may be reserved for conversion into goods at some later
point in time. As a consequence, another function of money is as a store
of value. The success of money as a store of value plainly depends on the
physical or real amount of goods and services that the monetary unit can
buy over time. This obviously depends on the stability of prices over time.
Should prices remain unchanged over time, the real purchasing power of
the monetary unit remains unchanged over time. Alternatively, inflation
(deflation) reduces (increases) the real purchasing power of money. Hirschberg argues that the specification of monetary obligations as a specific
number of currency units or nominalism necessarily means that creditors
suffer real losses while debtors make real gains in periods of inflation. He
contends that this real income redistribution is inequitable and that legal
procedures are necessary to effect justice.
The origins of price level changes is the starting point of this author's
discussion of solutions to unanticipated real income redistributions. He
argues that price level changes may result from deliberate government
manipulation of the money supply (which is exogenous to the private sec-

tor of the economy) and from the normal commercial motivations of economic agents (which are endogenous to the private sector of the economy).
The argument concludes with the contention that exogenous, but not endogenous, price level changes require intervention to prevent excessive real
income redistributions. Hirschberg suggests that the relationship between
monetary policy and price level changes is crucial but ignores the relationship between the latter and fiscal policy. This distinction is unnecessary
and artifical. Lastly, despite the theoretical implications above, the operational separation of price level changes according to source is virtually
impossible.
Given this problem and its sources, Hirschberg considers alternative
monetary structures for an economy -

metallistic, nominalistic, and va-
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loristic. The metallistic standard, which directly ties the money supply to
the stock of precious metals, prohibits government manipulation of the
money supply. However, it also is an arbitrary standard and may restrict
growth. Accordingly, it is not an acceptable monetary structure. The nominalistic standard works efficiently when prices are stable and produces the
above mentioned real income redistribution when they are not. More completely, this standard allows government use of monetary and fiscal policies to attempt to attain national objectives. Hirschberg's contention that
nominalism allows government decision-makers to make choices to maximize their personal wealth, at national expense, is generally incorrect. He
argues that custom and institutional arrangements promote the continuation of this system. The valoristic standard is simply the adjustment of
nominal monetary obligations to reflect constant real purchasing power
over time. The adjustment technique proposed involves some type of cost
of living index. Hirschberg concludes that the political and social entrenchment of nominalism prohibits its replacement by valorism. Consequently, the solution to the problem is a variation of nominalism - ex post
revaluation using price indices to gauge the degree of compensation. He
further argues that this policy should be applied by the judiciary rather
than legislators since the latter may be influenced by interest conflicts.
The implementation of the modified nominalistic principle is another
question entirely. Hirschberg argues that the rate of price level change as
well as the term of the obligation must be considered. Specifically, the
system should apply to medium and long term, rather than short term,
obligations. The extent of compensation to losers is subject to judicial
decision. This analysis desperately needs some consideration of the social
cost (benefit) and private benefit (cost) effects of such a system. More
precisely, how large is the problem? Do private contracts, currently, deal
with price change expectations efficiently? Will such a system disturb the
economy's constellation of prices, output, income and employment so that
inefficiency is encouraged? How will judicial income redistributions affect
these variables? Lastly, can price indices accurately represent the change
in living cost for any entity, except the average? In summary, Hirschberg
has identified an interesting problem; however, the proposed solution does
not really tell us if the problem is actually worth considering, operationally.
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